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NOTES
THE INDIVIDUAL VS. THE EMPLOYER:
WHO SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE UNDER
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW?
INTRODUCTION
In a case of first impression for the Second Circuit, the court
in Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,1 ruled on the issue of individual liability
in employment discrimination law. The significance of the Second
Circuit's holding is not that it joined a majority of the circuits,2
finding that individuals with supervisory control over a plaintiff
may not be held personally liable under Title VII, 3 but that it per-
mitted individual liability under state anti-discrimination law,4
specifically, the New York Human Rights Law. The case, which
involved the raping of a co-worker, illustrates the reality that, re-
gardless of the severity of the claim, victims may or may not re-
ceive justice under employment discrimination law.6
Although this was the first time the Second Circuit addressed
the issue of individual liability, the conflicting decisions under
1 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
2 See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1999); Hiller v.
Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490,
494 (7th Cir. 1998); Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.
1998); Lissau v. S. Food Serv. Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of
Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (all refusing to recognize
individual liability).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
4 Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317 (holding that a defendant's actual participation in the discrimi-
natory conduct may give rise to personal liability).
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(6) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2004).
6 The facts of this case are not necessarily representative of the majority of employment
discrimination claims.
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state and federal anti-discrimination law regarding individual li-
ability are not unique to this case.7 While basing their decisions
on similar sets of facts, courts repeatedly refuse to find individual
liability under federal law, yet sometimes hold individuals liable
under state law. Often, the courts' justifications are based primar-
ily on the differences in the statutory language or meaning.
The issue of individual liability for employment discrimina-
tion may initially be a matter of statutory interpretation, but the
fundamental question is why individuals should or should not be
held liable. This Note argues that holding both individuals and
employers liable under anti-discrimination law is the most effec-
tive means to accomplishing the goals of such laws: fully compen-
sating victims and deterring future and continuing discrimination.8
While the plain language of current federal employment discrimi-
nation statutes excludes individual liability, federal statutes should
be rewritten to permit individual, as well as enterprise, liability.
Part I compares the language of the federal statutes, which fore-
closes individual liability, with that of state statutes that have been
interpreted to permit individual liability. Part II outlines the his-
tory and goals of federal and state employment discrimination law
in the United States in an attempt to determine why Congress
opted for enterprise liability and against individual liability, as
well as why many states took the opposite approach. Part III ex-
amines the main arguments in favor of enterprise liability, while
Part IV considers arguments for supporting the imposition of per-
sonal liability. Finally, Part V sets forth arguments in support of
holding both individuals and employers liable by focusing on state
employment discrimination statutes and case law.
I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: FEDERAL V. STATE
Although the federal statutes are clear that victims of dis-
crimination are entitled to compensation, 9 they fail to specify from
whom protected victims may get such relief. As a result, the fed-
7 E.g., Homey v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33-34 (finding individual liabil-
ity under state law, but excluding it under Title VII), rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 02-2383, 02-
2384, 02-2465, 02-2546, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20776 (1st Cir. Oct. 9, 2003); see also Vivian
v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Iowa 1999); Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782,
787-88 (Ohio 1999); Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 926 (Wash. 2001) (all
acknowledging the exclusion of individual liability under federal law, yet finding liability under
state law).
8 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417, 422 (1975) (acknowledging that the
purposes of Title VII include the full compensation of the victim and deterrence of future dis-
crimination).
9 See infra notes 35, 38 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies available under
federal law).
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eral judiciary has been required to make this determination. De-
spite the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court decision on the issue' °
and the presence of some disagreement from the lower courts,1' the
appellate courts consistently hold that liability should fall solely to
the employer, thus prohibiting individual liability, even when the
individual is acting as an agent of the employer. 12  As mentioned
previously, this determination is based primarily on the plain lan-
guage of the law, specifically on the definition of "employer" and
the interpretation of the remedial scheme.
3
A. The Definition of "Employer" Under Federal
Anti-Discrimination Law
Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to ...discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."' 4  The act defines "employer" as a "person en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees ... and any agent of such a person."'' 5  The Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA")1 6 states that "[n]o [employer] shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability," 7 and
shares the same definition of "employer" with Title VII.18  The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")' 9 declares that
I0 See Brown, 20 P.3d at 926 n.1 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed whether individuals can be held liable under federal anti-discrimination statutes).
I Many lower courts have held that individual liability is permitted under federal law.
See, e.g., Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (C.D. Ill. 1994)
(interpreting Title VII to permit individual liability); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824
F. Supp. 769, 784-86 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same); Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F.
Supp. 526, 528-29 (D.N.H. 1993) (same); Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 422
(D.N.J. 1994) (interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to permit individual
liability); Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (same).
12 Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (stating that every circuit court that has addressed the is-
sue has found that there is no individual liability under Title VII); see supra note 2 (listing the
circuit courts that have refused to permit individual liability).
13 It should be noted that the courts regularly apply arguments regarding Title VII, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the ADA interchangeably. EEOC v. AIC
Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Williams v. Banning,
72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA use virtually
the same definition of "employer"); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1993) (noting that the ADEA's definition of "employer" is essentially identical to Title
Vi's).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
S1 Id. § 2000e(b).
16 Id. § 12101.
17 Id. § 12112(a).
Is Id. § 12111(5).
19 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
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"[ilt shall be unlawful for an employer to ... discriminate against
any individual ... because of such individual's age."2° In relevant
part, an "employer" under the ADEA is "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employ-
ees .... The term also means (1) any agent of such a person.'
The circuit courts that deny individual liability based on statu-
tory language generally offer some or all of the following justifica-
tions. First, the "and any agent" language in the statutory defini-
tions of "employer" ensures that courts impose respondeat supe-
rior liability upon the employers for the acts of their agents. 22 Re-
spondeat superior, under which a master is held responsible for the
torts of his servant committed within the scope of employment, is
the most common form of vicarious liability. 23 In Miller v. Max-
well's International, Inc.,24 the Ninth Circuit rejected the sugges-
tion that a supervisory employee or other "agent" may be consid-
ered a statutory "employer" for purposes of imposing personal li-
ability under Title VII or the ADEA. The court declared that the
obvious purpose of the agent provision was to codify the imposi-
tion of respondeat superior liability upon the company and not to
subject individual employees to personal liability.25  The Fourth
Circuit, in Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.,26 held that the inclu-
sion of "agent" under the ADEA's definition of "employer" did
not signal a congressional desire to impose liability on individual
supervisors. Instead, it simply represented "an unremarkable ex-
pression of respondeat superior-that discriminatory personnel
actions taken by an employer's agent may create liability for the
employer. 27 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. AIC Se-
curity Investigations, Ltd.,28 applied respondeat superior to an
ADA claim, holding that "the actual reason for the 'and any agent'
language in the definition of 'employer' was to ensure that courts
2 Id. § 623(a)(1).
21 Id. § 630(b).
22 E.g., Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding re-
spondeat superior applicable to Title VII); Lissau v. S. Food Serv. Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th
Cir. 1998) (same); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); EEOC v. AIC
Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding respondeat superior appli-
cable to the ADA); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding respondeat
superior applicable to ADEA).
23 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw oF TORTS § 333 (2000).
24 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
25 Id. at 587.
26 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994).
27 Id. at 510.
28 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
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would impose respondeat superior liability upon employers for the
acts of their agents. 29
Second, federal anti-discrimination statutes all limit employer
liability to employers with at least fifteen or twenty employees,3°
thus striking a balance between ending discrimination and protect-
ing small entities from the economic hardship of litigating dis-
crimination claims. 3  A contrary interpretation might upset that
balance and distort the statutory framework.32 In Miller, the court
concluded that this protection of small entities also precludes indi-
vidual liability because Congress would not intend to protect a
small entity, yet hold an individual personally liable.
33
B. The Remedial Scheme Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law
Circuit courts additionally examine the remedial scheme of
the federal laws, finding that the damages scheme under Title VII,
the ADA, and the ADEA precludes individual liability.34 First,
until 1991, only backpay and equitable relief, including reinstate-
ment, were available to plaintiffs,35 which are remedies typically
only obtainable from an employer.36 Second, the Civil Rights Act
29 Id. at 1281.
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (limiting liability under Title VII to employers with fifteen
or more employees); 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000) (limiting liability under the ADA to employers
with fifteen or more employees); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000) (limiting liability under the ADEA
to employers with twenty or more employees).
31 AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281.
32 Id. at 1282 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that a company president, as an "agent," must
be liable).
33 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) ("if Congress decided
to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress
intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees."); see also Birkbeck v.
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that it would be incongruous to
hold that the ADEA does not apply to the employer of ten people, but it does apply to a supervi-
sor in a company employing twenty or more employees).
34 See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); AIC Sec. Investiga-
tions, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281; Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (all
stating that the proper method to recover under federal anti-discrimination law is to sue the
employer).
35 Title VII states that if the defendant has been found to engage in discriminatory con-
duct, "the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such ... practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include .. .reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer) . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (2000).
36 Haynes v. Williams 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The relief granted under Title
VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a viola-
tion of the Act."); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 ("[A] successful Title VII plaintiff was typically
limited to reinstatement and backpay .... [These are] equitable remedies which are most ap-
propriately provided by employers, defined in the traditional sense of the word."); AIC Sec.
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281 (recognizing that at the time it defined employer in the
three statutes, Congress granted only remedies that an employing entity, not an individual, could
provide).
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of 199137 reinforces Congress' intent to preclude individual liabil-
ity. The act allowed for the recovery of punitive and compensa-
tory damages, 38 but it limited monetary recovery under Title VII
and the ADA by placing caps on damage awards based on the
number of employees. 39  "[T]he linkage between the size of the
employer and the amount of available relief clearly indicates a
congressional intent to limit plaintiffs' remedies to suits against
employers., 40  Courts have also inferred that Congress did not con-
sider individuals liable since it did not enact a cap for individu-
als.41 In Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc.,4z the Fourth Circuit
held that if "Congress felt that individual liability was needed to
deter... discrimination, surely it would have included this remedy
in the 1991 Amendments. 43 Additionally, "[i]t is a long stretch to
conclude that Congress silently intended to abruptly change its
earlier vision through an amendment to the remedial portions of
the statute alone." 44
C. State Statutes
Although federal and state employment discrimination stat-
utes share the same objectives,45 the statutes do not agree on how
37 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
38 Id. at 1072 ("In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional dis-
crimination ... the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages ... in
addition to any relief authorized by § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1))).
39 The statute places the following maximum limitations on damage awards depending on
the size of the employer: for employers with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees, there
is a $50,000 cap; there is a $100,000 cap for employers with more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees; there is a $200,000 cap for employers with more than 200 and fewer than 501 em-
ployees; and employers with more than 500 employers have a $300,000 cap. Id. at 1073 (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3)).
40 Lissau v. S. Food Serv. Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that Con-
gress' omission of a cap for individuals meant that Congress had not intended for individuals to
be liable).
4' AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281; see Lissau, 159 F.3d at 181 ("Nowhere
does the [1991 Act] mention individual liability as an available remedy."); Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1315 ("It appears that Congress contemplated that only employer-entities could be held liable
for compensatory and punitive damages, because 'if Congress had envisioned individual liabil-
ity.., it would have included individuals in this litany of limitations and discontinued the ex-
emption for small employers."' (quoting Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 n.2
(9th Cir. 1993))).
42 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998).
43 Id. at 181.
44 AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281.
45 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (describing Title
Vil's purposes of achieving equal employment opportunity and removing discriminatory em-
ployment barriers); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 889
(D.C. 1998) ("Our Human Rights Act was designed 'to secure an end in the District of Colum-
bia to discrimination for any reason ... ' (citing D.C. Code § 1-2501 (1992))); Vivian v.
[Vol. 54:3
THE INDIVIDUAL VS. THE EMPLOYER
best to achieve the elimination of workplace discrimination. In
contrast to the federal statutes' imposition of vicarious liability,
many state laws hold the individuals themselves liable for their
acts. 46 Several state anti-discrimination statutes define "employer"
in a slightly different manner than the federal statutes, which al-
lows for a finding of individual liability. Courts have found indi-
vidual liability under state law by interpreting phrases such as
"employer or agent of the employer" to include supervisors and
co-workers, or through recourse to aiding and abetting provi-
sions,47 which do not exist under federal law.48 The following is a
brief description of state employment discrimination statutes that
permit individual liability, and some discussion of case law per-
taining to the issue. This Note is limited to four representative
states: Washington, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Iowa; and to Wash-
ington D.C.
1. Washington
Under Washington's anti-discrimination law, section 49.60 of
the Revised Code of Washington, it is an unfair practice for any
employer to discriminate against a person in terms of employment
"because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national
origin, or the presence of any [disability]., 49 The Washington Su-
preme Court, in Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 50 refused to
follow the approach taken under federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes, finding that the interpretation of federal laws was not appli-
cable because the language of the state law is significantly differ-
ent from the corresponding federal law.5' That court relied on
Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 874-75 (Iowa 1999) (acknowledging that the Iowa Civil Rights Act
prohibits various forms of employment discrimination and was established to promote parity in
the workplace and market opportunity for all).
46 See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
47 An aider or abettor is one who "in some sort associate[s] himself with the venture,....
participate[s] in it as something that he wish[es] to bring about, [and] seek[s] by his action to
make it succeed." Roy v. United States, 652 A.2d 1098, 1104 (D.C. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
48 See, e.g., Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996); Comiskey v. Auto. In-
dus. Action Group, 40 F. Supp. 2d 877, 891 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp.
2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998); Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 210 (D.R.I.
1998); Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1996); Broomfield v. Lundell, 767
P.2d 697 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d
873, 888 (D.C. 1998); Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ohio 1999); Schram
v. Alberton's, Inc., 934 P.2d 483, 488 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Carr v. U.P.S., 955 S.W.2d 832, 838
(Tenn. 1997) (all finding individual liability under state employment discrimination laws).
49 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 2002).
50 20 P.3d 921 (Wash. 2001).
I IId. at 926.
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Marquis v. City of Spokane,52 which held that the interpretation of
federal anti-discrimination statutes is only persuasive if the provi-
sions in those statutes do not differ from those in section 49.60.53
The Marquis court concluded that federal courts' interpretations of
Title VII are not helpful in interpreting the Washington statute be-
cause there is no Title VII provision equivalent to the section
49.60 requirement that the act be construed liberally in order to
54accomplish its purposes.
In Brown, the court focused primarily on the differences in the
definitions of "employer" under the state and federal laws.55 The
Washington statute defines "employer" to include "any person act-
ing in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who em-
,,56ploys eight or more persons. The court interpreted the phrase
"person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indi-
rectly" as standing alone, and the following clause "who [employs]
eight or more persons" as referring to the term "employer" and not
to the whole phrase. Thus, a manager acting in the interest of an
employer who employs eight or more people can be held individu-
ally liable for his or her discriminatory acts .
2. Ohio
Under Ohio's employment discrimination statute, section
4112 of the Ohio Revised Code, "[i]t shall be an unlawful dis-
criminatory practice: (A) for any employer, because of the race,
color, religion, sex . ..of any person . . . to discriminate against
that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to
employment. 58  The Ohio Supreme Court, in Genaro v. Central
Transport, Inc.,59 held that "individual supervisors and managers
are accountable for their own discriminatory conduct occurring in
the workplace environment., 60 The court ruled that the plain lan-
52 922 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1996).
53 Id. at 50; see also Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45, 54 (Wash. 1999) (finding Title
VI case law unpersuasive when interpreting state law due to the significant differences in the
remedial provisions of the two laws).
54 Marquis, 922 P.2d at 50.
55 Brown, 20 P.3d at 926.
56 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(3) (West 2002).
57 Brown, 20 P.3d at 926. The court also relied on the interpretations of two other juris-
dictions that have fair employment law statutes that define "employer" similarly. Both the
District of Columbia and Ohio have ruled that the definition of "employer" encompasses indi-
vidual liability. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 888
(D.C. 1998); Genaro v. Cent. Transp. Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 787 (Ohio 1999).
58 OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
59 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999).
60 Id. at 787.
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guage of the statute, particularly the definition of "employer," im-
poses individual liability for discriminatory conduct. 61 Under the
Ohio statute, "employer" includes "any person employing four or
more persons within the state, and any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer." 62 The court reasoned
that the language employed by the General Assembly in section
4112 should be construed liberally because it is much broader in
scope than that applied by the analogous Title VII provision.63
The court also relied on Davis v. Black,64 which concluded that
"[c]learly, the supervisor for whom an employer may be vicari-
ously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior is also an
employer within [the Ohio statute's] definition [of employer]. 65
3. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute makes it unlaw-
ful "[f]or an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the
race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orienta-
tion..., to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment such individual or to discriminate against such indi-
vidual in compensation or in terms . . . of employment. ' 66 The
statute exempts private employers of fewer than six persons but
does not otherwise limit who can be held liable.67 The appellate
court in Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Associates68 held that "the plain
language of the statute provides on its face for individual personal
liability in several sections, unlike the cognate provisions of other
jurisdictions (including Federal)." 69 For instance, the statute for-
bids any person to "aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of
any of the acts forbidden under this chapter., 70 The Massachusetts
statute also includes a mandate that its provisions must be con-
strued liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, which are
to discourage and penalize employment discrimination.7'
61 Id. at 785.
62 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(2).
63 Genaro, 703 N.E.2d at 785.
64 591 N.E.2d 11 (Ohio 1991).
65 Id. at 19.
66 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15 1B, § 4 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003).
67 Id. § 1.
68 738 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
69 Id. at 764.
70 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(5); see Schutz v. Go Ahead Vacations, Inc., No.
97-4409, 1999 WL 959681, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 1, 1999) (finding a company president
liable under the aiding and abetting provision for dictating a policy of discrimination against
older workers).
71 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9.
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4. Iowa
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Vivian v. Madison,72 ruled that
under the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), 73 supervisory employ-
ees are subject to individual liability for unfair employment prac-
tices.74 The court, ruling on a matter of first impression, based its
conclusion on several differences between the ICRA and Title VII.
First, unlike Title VII, which prohibits any "employer" from dis-
criminating, the ICRA forbids "any [p]erson to refuse to hire, ac-
cept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any
employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment.., because
of the age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion or dis-
ability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature
of the occupation. 75 Second, the ICRA incorporates an aiding and
abetting provision that forbids "[a]ny person to intentionally aid,
abet, compel, or coerce another person to engage in any of the
practices declared unfair or discriminatory by this chapter. 76 In
contrast, Title VII contains no similar language.77 Third, the re-
medial sections of the ICRA allow a claimant to commence an ac-
tion against a person, employer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization alleged to have committed a discriminatory act.78
The IRCA defines a person as "one or more individuals, part-
nerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees,
receivers, and the state of Iowa and all political subdivisions and
agencies thereof., 79 The court in Vivian rejected the defendant's
argument that the exemption of employers with fewer than four
employees from liability8° was evidence of the drafters' intent not
to hold individual employees liable. The court additionally cited
two other provisions of the act. The first states that the chapter
should be "construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. 81 The
second says that "[e]very person in this state is entitled to the op-
portunity for employment on equal terms with every other person.
A person or employer shall not discriminate in the employment of
individuals because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, or
72 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999).
73 IOWA CODE ANN. § 216 (West 2000).
74 Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 872, 878.
71 IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (emphasis added); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (us-
ing the term "employer," rather than "person").
76 IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.11.
77 Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 873 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
78 IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.15(1); cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (not authorizing claims
against persons).
79 IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2 (11).
80 Id. § 216.6(6)(a).
81 Id. § 216.18.
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ancestry." 82 The court found it "significant that the words 'person'
and 'employer' are used in conjunction with one another, indicat-
ing the legislature's clear perception of their separate meanings."
83
5. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia Human Rights Act84 makes it unlaw-
ful for an employer to discriminate against an individual with re-
spect to that individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment. 85 The term "employer" is defined as "any
person who, for compensation, employs an individual, except for
the employer's parent, spouse, children or domestic servants, en-
gaged in work in and about the employer's household; any person
acting in the interest of such employer, directly or indirectly; and
any professional association. 86 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals noted that federal anti-discrimination statutes differ from
the D.C. Human Rights Act in a few critical respects, which the
court used as a justification to permit individual liability under
D.C. law.
87
First, Title VII's definition of "employer" does not contain the
phrase "any person acting in the interest of such employer, directly
or indirectly." 88  Second, the Human Rights Act makes it an
unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to "aid, abet, in-
cite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under
the provisions of this chapter or to attempt to do so."8 9 Third, the
court acknowledged that the Human Rights Act does not include
an exception for small employers, such as the minimum employee
requirement under federal law. 90
In sum, the differences between federal and state anti-
discrimination laws have resulted in conflicting determinations of
liability under employment discrimination law. Based on courts'
interpretations of the laws, it appears that Congress believes that
82 Id. § 729.4.
83 Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 875.
84 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
85 Id. § 2-1402.11(a)(l).
86 Id. § 2-1401.02(10).
87 Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 889 (D.C. 1998).
The case discusses the former codification of the Human Rights Act, at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
2501 et seq. (1992 & Supp. 1998). The current codification cited in this Note is identical in all
material respects.
88 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 15 (defining "employer" under Title VII).
89 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.62; cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (containing no provision
proscribing aiding and abetting).
90 Wallace, 715 A.2d at 889 (noting that if an employer who employs only a single indi-
vidual is subject to the act, then it is unlikely that the Council intended to protect individuals
from liability).
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vicarious, or enterprise, liability alone is adequate, while many
states think that individual liability is necessary. In an attempt to
determine how and why the federal and state laws were adopted in
their current form, Part II explores the purpose and history of em-
ployment discrimination law in the United States.
II. THE PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE U.S.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the state and federal
governments sought to regulate the employment relationship
through statutes intended to alleviate the plight of workers unable
to protect themselves from exploitation in the workplace. 91 The
newest attempts gave rise to the law of employment discrimina-
tion, including Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. These laws
restrain employers by prohibiting discriminatory actions based on
race, color, sex, national origin, age, religion, or disability.92 The
overall structure of state and federal employment discrimination
laws is the same: "[I]ndividuals or members of an EEO commis-
sion may complain to the commission that an employer, a labor
union, or an employment agency has discriminated against
them., 93 However, the individual provisions in state and federal
statutes, such as those pertaining to liability coverage, are not al-
ways similar. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear and, as
the next subsection shows, legislative history at the state level pro-
vides limited guidance on the issue.
A. The History of State Anti-Discrimination Law
The earliest post-Reconstruction statutory efforts to end em-
ployment discrimination were state laws. State concerns about
threats to the rights and privileges of its citizens, domestic discord,
and the undermining of the foundations of a free democratic state,
prompted the majority of the proposed equal employment opportu-
nity bills.94 "The enactment of [most state fair employment prac-
tice bills has been] described variously as an exercise of police
power, as a fulfillment of the provisions of the state constitution,
91 JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION 1 (5th ed. 2001).
92 The law also restrains labor unions and employment agencies from discriminating, but
this Note focuses on employers only.
93 PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL 18 (1985).
94 Note, Fair Employment Practices-A Comparison of State Legislation and Proposed
Bills, 24 N.Y.U. L. REv. 398, 399 (1949).
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as a declaration of public policy or as a combination of two or
more such bases.,
95
Commencing in the 1940s, a number of states enacted fair
employment practice statutes to combat discrimination in employ-
ment. 96 As of 1963, twenty-two states barred racial discrimination
in private employment in one form or another.97 These statutes
took one of two forms: (1) those that expressed a public policy
against discrimination in employment, but contained no remedial
provision; and (2) those that defined prohibited employment prac-
tices and provided an enforcement mechanism. 98 New York state,
which defined unlawful discrimination to include an employer's
refusal to hire or decision to discharge an individual from em-
ployment because of his or her race, color, or creed, 99 enacted a
series of statutes that typified the second form.' ° The laws pro-
vide for enforcement by a State Commission for Human Rights,
which, upon the filing of a discrimination complaint, is to investi-
gate and, if a violation is found, to order reinstatement, backpay,
and compensatory damages. l01 The New York form exemplifies
the current structure of most state employment discrimination stat-
utes.10
2
The issue of coverage, in particular the number of employees
required to hold the employer liable, resulted in much debate and
numerous legislative proposals among the states. 0 3 Based on the
bills enacted, the minimum number of employees needed before
the law applied varied from one to fifty, but the most common fig-
ure was six or eight.°4 Unfortunately, the broad overview of the
history of state employment discrimination law fails to illuminate
95 Id. at 398.
96 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 91, at 14.
97 DUANE LOCKARD, TOWARD EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF STATE AND LOCAL
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 24 (1968). The states included: New York, New Jersey, Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, Michigan, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Colorado, California, Ohio, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Alaska, Indiana, and Hawaii.
98 FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 91, at 15.
99 The Supreme Court upheld New York employment discrimination law in Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945), declaring that there was "no constitutional basis for the
contention that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color,
or creed by an organization."
100 Such laws included: N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40-43 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2004);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220-e
(McKinney 2002).
101 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 295-297.
102 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (2001 & Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6
(West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60 (West 2002).
t03 Note, supra note 94, at 400-01 (citations omitted).
104 LOCKARD, supra note 97, at 82.
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the rationale behind the various figures and does not explain why
the statutes took their current form. As the Iowa Supreme Court in
Vivian v. Madison'05 stated, "there is surprisingly little to discover
with regard to legislative history of the ICRA. Our only sources of
interpretive guidance come from [section] 216.18, which states
that the chapter should be construed broadly . ."'06 That court
went on to infer that the Iowa legislature intended the ICRA to be
broad enough to embrace individual liability because it included an
aiding and abetting provision and specifically prohibited discrimi-
nation by "any person.
'' 07
The failure of many states to pass or enforce anti-
discrimination laws,10 8 and an increase in congressional support for
a federal employment discrimination statute shifted attention to the
federal level.1°9 The civil rights movement caused a steady in-
crease in legislative support, and following the 1963 March on
Washington by over 200,000 people, Congress responded by en-
acting the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ° Among its provisions was
Title VII, which marked the beginning of the modern era of em-
ployment discrimination law in the U.S."'
B. The History of Federal Anti-Discrimination Law (Title VII)
On July 24, 1964, President Johnson signed Title VII, which
states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."'" 2  Title VII has been the focus of more litigation and
wide-ranging judicial and academic scrutiny than any other federal
statute designed to promote the goal of equal employment oppor-
tunity." 3 The issue of liability is particularly contentious. Cover-
105 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999).
106 Id. at 874.
107 Id. at 877; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 216.6(1), 216.11 (West 2000); see also Brown v. Scott
Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 927 (Wash. 2001) (relying on similar provisions, rather than
legislative history, to infer the legislature's intent to permit individual liability).
10 The southern states refused to pass state anti-discrimination laws, and the more liberal
states worried that the passage of EEO laws would encourage businesses to move elsewhere.
BURSTEIN, supra note 93, at 64.
109 See id. at 65.
110 Id. at 69.
111 Title VII became law twenty years after the Supreme Court declared that the Constitu-
tion does not prevent the states from enforcing laws to protect workers from racial discrimina-
tion.
11242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
113 This section will focus more on Title VII than the other federal statutes due to the vast
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age received more attention than virtually any other aspect of the
proposed statute; the House and Senate voted twenty-four times on
amendments affecting coverage.'
1 4
Courts often look to legislative history to guide their interpre-
tation of certain laws, and Title VII is no exception." 15  Federal
courts generally utilize legislative history to support their decision
to exclude individual liability under Title VII. The Second Circuit,
in Tomka v Seiler Corp.," 6 found that most of the comments di-
rected at the minimum employee threshold refer only to employer-
entities, implying that Congress did not contemplate agent liability
under Title VII. A letter from the minority membership of the
House Committee on the Judiciary stated that "[c]overage [of Title
VII] is limited to businesses and labor organizations affecting
commerce."'1 7 Moreover, the floor debate over Title VII indicates
that the costs associated with defending against discrimination
claims were a factor in the decision to implement a minimum em-
ployment requirement. 1 8 The Tomka court also emphasized the
noticeable absence of any mention of agent liability during the de-
bates.1 9  In Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America,
Inc., 120 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
also acknowledged that legislative history regarding the limit on
the size of employers covered under Title VII does reflect a con-
cern about the ability of small businesses to bear litigation costs.121
Moreover, as amended, Title VII and the ADA permit recov-
ery of punitive damages for intentional discrimination engaged in
with malice or reckless indifference.122  According to Homey v.
Westfield Gage Co., 23 the accompanying legislative history indi-
cates that those remedies were meant to provide an additional de-
amount of case law available and because Title VII is the model for the other laws.
14 BURSTEIN, supra note 93, at 25.
"15See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 n.1 (1986) (Marshall, J., con-
curring); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); Homey v. Westfield Gage
Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34-35 (D. Mass. 2000); Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc.,
868 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 n. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (all discussing the legislative history of Title VII).
11666 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
117 110 CONG. REc. 6566 (1964).
1 8 ee Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (citing 110 CONG. REc. S13,092 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Cotton); 110 CONG. REC. S13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REC.
S13,092-93 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Morse)). It should be noted that there were also other
factors considered by Congress in enacting Title VII, including the protection of intimate and
personal relations existing in small businesses, and potential effects on competition and the
economy. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. S7088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Stennis); 110 CONG. REC.
S7207-17 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark)).
119 Id.
120868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
121 Id. at 1013 n.l 1 (citing 110 CONG. REC. S13,092 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Cotton)).
12242 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
123 95 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2000).
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terrent to employers, not individuals. Legislative history states
that "[m]aking employers liable for all losses-economic and oth-
erwise-which are incurred as a consequence of prohibited dis-
crimination... will serve as a necessary deterrent to future acts of
discrimination."'' 24 Congress emphasized that employers must pre-
vent the discriminatory conduct before it occurs: "[M]onetary
damages simply raise the cost of an employer's engaging in inten-
tional discrimination, thereby providing employers with additional
incentives to prevent intentional discrimination in the workplace
before it happens.' 25
Other courts, acknowledging a lack of available legislative
history regarding liability coverage under any of the federal stat-
utes, have looked elsewhere to determine Congress's intent.12 6 The
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), t27 on which Title VII
was modeled, 28 does include such legislative history, and has thus
been examined. 29 The definition of "employer" under the NLRA
was amended in 1947 from including any person "acting in the
interest of an employer"' 13 to covering "any person acting as an
agent of an employer."' 3' Professor Rebecca Hanner White ex-
plains the purpose behind the definition change:
Under the [original version], employers had been held liable
for the actions of persons who were not acting within the
scope of their authority, and those cases prompted employers
to demand that the statutory language be amended. At the
same time, Congress was reluctant to allow employers to
evade vicarious liability by claiming that their employees'
acts were not authorized or ratified. Thus, in amending the
NLRA to include "agents" within the statutory definition,
Congress made clear its intent not only to absolve employers
from liability for actions of persons who were not their
124 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 607.
25Id. at 603.
126 See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The legislative history of
Title VII is virtually barren of indications, one way or the other, of a vicarious responsibility for
employers."); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 51.01 (6th ed. 2000) ("Other statutes dealing with the same subject as the one being con-
strued ... [comprise] another form of extrinsic aid useful in deciding questions of interpreta-
tion.").
127 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2000).
128 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 n.l (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
12 9 See id.; Albemarle Paper Co., v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1975); Low v. Hasbro,
Inc., 817 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.R.I. 1993) (all cases examining legislative history of the NLRA
to interpret congressional intent regarding Title VII).13) H.R. 3020, 89th Cong. (1947).
13129 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000).
[Vol. 54:3
THE INDIVIDUAL VS. THE EMPLOYER
agents but also to hold employers liable, using the common
law of agency, for the acts of those who were.
The court in Low v. Hasbro, Inc.'33 also concluded that "when
Congress included 'any agent' in the NLRA it was an attempt to
limit the employer's liability rather than to grant a new cause of
action against all agents or employees of an employer."'
' 34
Additionally, the remedial scheme originally designed for Ti-
tle VII, which allowed recovery of only equitable relief for a statu-
tory violation, was also borrowed from the NLRA. 135 Absent vi-
carious liability, victims of discrimination would be denied this
relief. There is not, however, an NLRA counterpart to the 1991
amendments permitting punitive and compensatory damages under
Title VII. 136 The longstanding acceptance of vicarious liability
under the NLRA may explain the lack of discussion by Congress
or the courts concerning whether vicarious liability was allowed
under the federal employment discrimination statutes. In sum, the
legislative history available for Title VII assists in determining
how and why the federal statutes came to be adopted in their cur-
rent form imposing vicarious liability and excluding individual
liability.
III. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING VICARIOUs LIABILITY
Vicarious liability is generally defined as the imposition of li-
ability upon one party for the wrong committed by another. 37 One
of the most common forms of vicarious liability is the infliction of
liability on an employer for the wrong of an employee, based upon
the principle of respondeat superior. 138 Federal employment dis-
crimination law imposes such liability, holding employers legally
responsible for the discriminatory acts of their agents under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. 39 Although statutory construction
supports this and opposes personal liability, the courts and com-
132 Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimina-
tion, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 538-39 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
133 817 F. Supp. 249 (D.R.I. 1993).
1341d. at 250 (quoting Friend v. Union Dime Sav. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
135 See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000); Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 n.1 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
136Compensatory and punitive damages are not available under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (2000).
137 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 333.
13 
sd.139 hite, supra note 132, at 509.
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mentators have put forth additional arguments explaining why vi-
carious liability is necessary.' 4
A common argument holds that the employer is in the best po-
sition to remedy discrimination, and therefore vicarious liability is
necessary to ensure that victims are fully compensated.' 4' Judg-
ment awards composed of backpay and compensatory and punitive
damages may be uncollectible against individuals since most do
not have the financial resources necessary to satisfy such awards.
The Second Circuit stated that "a Title VII plaintiff will rarely file
a suit against the agent alone, because the plaintiff has the best
chance of recovering from the employing entity."'' 42 Also, only the
employer can supply some meaningful remedies, such as rein-
statement and promotion.
Additionally, courts have held that the statutes' deterrence ob-
jective would be undermined without vicarious liability. 43  An
employer forced to pay damages due to the discriminatory acts of
its agent has an incentive, and the means, to ensure that its agents
do not discriminate. The Seventh Circuit held that individual li-
ability is unnecessary because "the employing entity is still liable,
and that entity . . . [has] the proper incentives to adequately disci-
pline [discriminatory] employees, as well as to instruct and train
employees to avoid actions that might impose liability."' 44  Thus,
the employer is in the best position to deter agents from discrimi-
nating by providing programs to educate employees on employ-
ment discrimination law and enforcing anti-discrimination policies
that threaten punishment for violators.
14 See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995);
Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985); Bramesco v. Drug Computer Consult-
ants, 834 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[E]xposure of [agents] to personal liability may
interfere with the functions of their employers .... "); Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co.,
833 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing the negative impact that holding individual
personnel liable for an entity's misconduct can have on the ability of the entity to perform its
functions); Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 605-07
(1988) (arguing that vicarious liability is economically efficient); White, supra note 132, at 543.
14" See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22 (1975); White, supra
note 132, at 516 (suggesting that recognizing individual liability might discourage courts from
holding employers liable and therefore depriving plaintiffs of their most likely and effective
source of redress).
142 Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1315 (2d Cir. 1995).
143 Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417; AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282
(rejecting the argument that without individual liability discrimination will be unpunished and
undeterred); Horn, 755 F.2d at 605 (arguing that "discrimination can best be eradicated by en-
forcing a strict liability rule that ensures compensation for victims and creates an incentive for
the employer to take the strongest possible affirmative measures to prevent the hiring and reten-
tion of [discriminators]").
I" See AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282 (stating that Congress has "struck a
balance between deterrence and societal cost").
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Finally, it is the employer's delegation of authority to the
agent who has "caused" the wrong and thus, the employer should
be held vicariously liable. 45 As one commentator observed, "[i]t
is the delegation of power from the employer to the individual su-
pervisor that enables one individual to inflict a statutory harm on
another."' 46 Absent an employment relationship, there is no statu-
tory violation because the actions of an individual outside the
workplace do not violate any employment discrimination law. 1
47
These arguments are persuasive in justifying vicarious liabil-
ity under employment discrimination statutes; however, they do
not justify refusing to impose personal liability as well. Imposing
individual liability in employment discrimination cases will not
weaken the justifications for employer liability, and will in fact
enhance them. 1
48
IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
Despite the circuit courts' general agreement that federal em-
ployment discrimination statutes prohibit individual liability, state
courts take the opposite view regarding some state employment
discrimination laws. 149 Beyond the statutory language differences,
state courts have also presented additional justifications. 150 First, a
common argument holds that individual liability is essential to the
satisfaction of employment discrimination law's deterrence func-
tion.' 5 1 Individuals are less inclined to discriminate knowing that
their actions will be punished. The district court in Jendusa v.
Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Inc.12 held that the threat
of a sizeable monetary penalty is essential in deterring discrimina-
145 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76-77 (1986) ("[lIt is the authority vested in
the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong . .
146 White, supra note 132, at 543.
147 Id.
'
48 See infra Part V (discussing the advantages of recognizing both employer and individ-
ual liability).
149 See, e.g., Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 888 (D.C.
1998); Vivian v. Madison 601 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Iowa 1999); Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703
N.E.2d 782, 785-86 (Ohio 1999); Schram v. Albertson's, Inc., 934 P.2d 483, 488 (Or. Ct. App.
1997); Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 928 (Wash. 2001) (all finding indi-
vidual liability under state employment discrimination laws).
150 The state courts rely on the lower federal courts that, although not followed by higher
courts, make persuasive arguments in favor of personal liability under employment discrimina-
tion law. See supra note II (listing lower federal courts that favor the imposition of individual
liability).
151 See Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (N.D. 111.
1994) ("[T]he prospect of individual liability is essential if the antidiscrimination statutes are to
have their full deterrent effect."); see also Wallace, 715 A.2d at 889 (finding individual liability
necessary in some circumstances to prevent future discrimination).
152 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. 111. 1994).
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tory conduct among employees, especially those who are not in
high-salaried positions. 53 In addition, direct personal liability en-
sures that the discriminator is reprimanded, whereas vicarious li-
ability may not result in any punishment for the wrongdoer if the
employer fails to impose disciplinary action.1 54  The Washington
Supreme Court, in Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 155 held
that the state law's strong commitment to deter discrimination im-
plies that the individual discriminator should be held liable.
15 6
Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Wallace v.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,157 held that in order to
"secure an end . . . to discrimination," the individual who denied
the plaintiff equal employment opportunity must be held liable. 1
5 8
Second, courts and commentators argue that personal liability
vindicates victims of discrimination more effectively than vicari-
ous liability. 59  A monetary judgment against an employer is in-
sufficient to fully compensate the injured party. It is necessary to
hold the wrongdoer accountable for his or her unlawful acts before
the victims can feel vindicated.' 6° The court in Wallace, favoring
personal liability, cautioned that following the federal laws' impo-
sition of vicarious liability would result in a plaintiff's inability to
secure relief against an individual who willfully denied the plain-
tiff equal employment opportunity. 16' The chance of victim re-
dress will also increase because the injured parties are more likely
to sue if personal liability is recognized. 62 Moreover, the imposi-
tion of vicarious liability may discourage victims from filing law-
153Id. at 1012.
154 See id. (contending that many employers fail to discipline supervisors after a court find-
ing that the supervisor did discriminate).
155 20 P.3d 921 (Wash. 2001).
156 ld. at 927.
157 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).
38 Ild. at 889.
15 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Surgical Group Assocs., 871 F. Supp. 979, 986 (S.D. Ohio
1994); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 784-86 (N.D. I11. 1993); see
also Tracy L. Gonos, A Policy Analysis of Individual Liability--The Case for Amending Title
VII to Hold Individuals Personally Liable for Their Illegal Discriminatory Acts, 2 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 265, 291 (1999) (stating that psychological vindication should not be
undervalued); Phillip L. Lamberson, Comment, Personal Liability for Title VII: Thirty Years of
Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 419, 420-21 (1994) (stating that the harasser must be joined in
the suit as a defendant before plaintiff can feel fully vindicated).
160 See Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Rec-
ognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 584 n.60 (1994) ("Congress's
goal is to compensate victims in fact, not merely to provide an opportunity for compensation
that may be undesirable to victims.").
161 Wallace, 715 A.2d at 889.
162 Goldberg, supra note 160, at 584.
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suits because it may jeopardize the ability of the employer to stay
in business and to provide jobs. 63
Finally, the individual who acts unlawfully should be pun-
ished for his or her wrongdoing.' 64 Placing the blame on the indi-
vidual discriminator, rather than the employing entity, better
serves the interests of public policy and justice. As one commen-
tator states:
[A]gents who discriminate are usually deemed more blame-
worthy than their employers, who are merely vicariously ex-
posed to liability for the violations of their agents ...
[R]ecognizing employer liability without recognizing agent
liability would be anomalous as a legal doctrine. As such,
the blameworthiness theory of tort liability also requires that
victims be allowed to sue agents who discriminate.
The Washington Supreme Court, in Brown, emphasized that "[t]he
more incongruous position here would be that the Legislature de-
clared such a broad public policy against discrimination while at
the same time protecting supervisors who directly discriminate
against the employees they oversee.' ' 166 The Ohio Supreme Court,
in Genaro v. Central Transportation, Inc.,' 6 7 agreed, stating that
"[bly holding supervisors and managers liable for their discrimina-
tory actions, the antidiscrimination purposes of [Ohio's law] are
facilitated, thereby furthering the public policy goals of this state
regarding workplace discrimination.' 68
Although convincing, the arguments for the implementation
of personal liability fail to justify adequately the exclusion of vi-
carious liability. Proponents on both sides of the issue present
credible arguments, but neglect to acknowledge that vicarious and
personal liability are not mutually exclusive. Recognizing indi-
vidual and vicarious liability is the most logical method of impos-
ing liability under employment discrimination law because it takes
advantage of the benefits that each side offers.
163 Id.
164 Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994); Strzelecki v. Schwarz
Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 829 n.3 (N.D. nI. 1993).
165 Goldberg, supra note 160, at 589.
166 Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921,927-28 (Wash. 2001).
167 03 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999).
168 Id. at 785.
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V. THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IS TO HOLD BOTH
EMPLOYERS AND INDIVIDUALS LIABLE
Authority to hold both individuals and employers liable can
be found at common law. Specifically, common law agency prin-
ciples are consistent with recognizing individual and employer li-
ability. 69  The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that
"[p]rincipal and agent can be joined in one action for a wrong re-
sulting from tortious conduct of an agent ... and a judgment can
[be rendered] against each."'' 70 The employer is not liable because
of its negligence, but is vicariously liable because of its legal rela-
tionship to the employee.' 7' Although employment discrimination
claims are statutory claims, rather than common law claims, state
courts have generally followed the principle of respondeat superior
when imposing both individual and vicarious liability. 172 In Brown
v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 173 the Washington Supreme Court
reasoned that under the theory of respondeat superior, employer
liability is not based on fault, but on social and economic policy
reasons such as the employer's authority over the employee and
the employer's deep pockets. 74  The fault rests with the wrong-
doer, who is also liable.
Furthermore, holding both the individual perpetrators and
their employers liable is the most effective way to accomplish em-
ployment discrimination law's dual purpose: to deter discrimina-
tion in the workplace and to compensate the victims.1 75
169 See Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1012-13 (N.D.
nl1. 1994).
1
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359C(1) (1957).
171 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 170.
172 See, e.g., Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ohio 1999) ("[Ohio's]
definition of employer including 'any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer' . . . is meant only to ensure that employers cannot escape respondeat superior or
agency liability."); Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 927 n.3 (Wash. 2001)
(discussing theory of respondeat superior).
173 20 P.3d 921 (Wash. 2001).
174 Id. at 927 n.3.
175 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417, 422 (1975); Vakharia v. Swedish
Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785 (N.D. hi. 1993) ("Title VII has always served two pur-
poses: to compensate the victims of discrimination . . .and to deter discrimination ....");
Gonos, supra note 159, at 277. Under some circumstances, a victim may not want to sue both
the employer and the individual. The proposed scheme of liability allows the victim to have this
choice. See Goldberg, supra note 160, at 583 (discussing when a plaintiff may be reluctant to
hold both the individual and the employer liable).
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A. Employment Discrimination Is More Likely to Be Deterred if the
Individual and the Employer Are Both Liable
A strong commitment to the deterrence and elimination of
employment discrimination suggests that both the individual who
discriminates and the employer for whom he or she works should
be held liable. 176 Under a scheme of both employer and individual
liability, anti-discrimination statutes deter discrimination in two
ways: agents fear direct liability, and they fear employer repercus-
sions due to the employer's exposure to vicarious liability. 77
Making the individual discriminator directly liable through the
court system, and indirectly liable through employer ramifications,
is the most effective means to deterring and ultimately eliminating
employment discrimination.
1. Discriminators Fear Liability
Arguably, one of the most powerful deterrents of employment
discrimination is the threat of personal bankruptcy, which can oc-
cur when individuals are held directly liable for their unlawful
conduct. 7 8 Commonly, the employees involved in discrimination
cases are not highly compensated executives, but rather mid-level
employees.179 "For them, being forced to even pay a portion of the
litigation costs and damages in [an employment discrimination]
action could be financially ruinous." 180 Direct liability also threat-
ens an individual's reputation because of the stigma that at-
taches.' 1 Discriminators may have difficulty obtaining alternative
employment if potential employers discover the past discrimina-
tion. Additionally, employer-enforced anti-discrimination policies
and subsequent repercussions for violators are also strong deter-
rents. Employers that are vicariously liable for the unlawful con-
duct of employees are encouraged to enforce policies that may
threaten a discriminator with demotion or discharge. Absent either
the direct or the indirect liability, employment discrimination is
less likely to be deterred.
176 Brown, 20 P.3d at 928 ("[E]nabling employees to sue [individuals] who have discrimi-
nated against them is consistent with the broad public policy to eliminate all discrimination in
employment."); Lamberson, supra note 159, at 428 (stating that the best way to stop discrimina-
tion is to hold both the institutional employer and the individual who actually committed the
discriminatory acts liable).
177 Goldberg, supra note 160, at 584-85.
178 Sykes, supra note 140, at 567 n.9; Goldberg, supra note 160, at 585.
179 Lamberson, supra note 159, at 421.
180Id.
181 See id. (stating that in addition to monetary liability, a guilty verdict against an individ-
ual "would be stigmatizing and would likely have adverse consequences on future employment
or promotions").
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Workplace anti-discrimination programs and the threat of em-
ployer discipline are insufficient to deter discrimination absent
personal liability. There is no guarantee that the employer will
enforce programs and policies designed to prevent and punish dis-
crimination. Circumstances exist where an employer forced to
take responsibility for an employee's unlawful conduct either fails
to inflict punishment on that individual or an individual subjected
to the employer's discipline is not negatively affected. It is plau-
sible that an employer forced to go to court on behalf of the al-
leged discriminatory actions of its agent may choose to focus its
anger after a loss on the injustice that occurred in the courtroom
and not on the agent. 182 The district court in Jendusa v. Cancer
Treatment Centers of America, Inc.,183 found that employers more
often than not neglect to punish employees for discriminatory con-
duct, especially if the employee is a high-ranking individual whom
the employer may view as essential to the operation of the busi-
ness. 184 Moreover, an employer's deterrence measures, such as
discharge, lower compensation, or reduction of advancement op-
portunities,185 are not always effective, particularly if the discrimi-
nating employee is nearing retirement or will otherwise be termi-
nating his employment. As a result, indirect liability will not suf-
ficiently affect individuals who fall into any of these categories to
aid in deterring employment discrimination.
Conversely, direct individual liability alone is inadequate to
deter employment discrimination. Repercussions by employers,
such as discharge and demotion, are strong financial deterrents,
and in some respects may have an impact similar to personal bank-
ruptcy. Individuals may even consider the risk of a court-ordered
damage award less threatening than the chance of losing their jobs
and ultimately their source of income. Furthermore, without vi-
carious liability, employers will lose the monetary incentive to in-
stitute anti-discrimination programs and policies, which not only
punish known perpetrators, but also help discourage future acts by
potential discriminators:
1
8
2 See Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (N.D. 11l.
1994) ("[E]mployers who lose an employment discrimination suit walk away ... believing that
an injustice has been worked against them at the hands of a jury sympathetic to a disabled, aged,
or minority plaintiff. The court does not believe that these employers... will.., discipline the
responsible supervisory personnel.").
183 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Il. 1994).
84Id. at 1012.
185 See Goldberg, supra note 160, at 585 n.67 (discussing sanctions an employer may im-
pose).
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[T]he employer is in the best position to institute and post
workplace prohibitions on discrimination, put grievance pro-
cedures in place, inform workers of their rights, and investi-
gate and eradicate discriminatory conduct. Thus, it is crucial
that the economic incentives that do exist for employers to
deter discrimination are not weakened or eliminated alto-
gether.1
86
In addition, without vicarious liability, the threat of a tainted repu-
tation that results from being held liable for discrimination will no
longer be an incentive for the employing entity to aid in eliminat-
ing discrimination.
2. Victims Will Take More Legal Action
Imposing employer and individual liability creates another
path of deterrence: Victims of employment discrimination are
more likely to sue. The Seventh Circuit, which ruled that indi-
viduals cannot be held liable under the ADA, acknowledged that
"increasing the number of potentially liable defendants would in-
crease deterrence, as businesses put more resources into avoiding
liability and plaintiffs saw more potentially liable parties and had a
greater incentive to sue."' 187 The addition of individual liability
provides victims of discrimination the opportunity to sue as a
means of allocating blame. Thus, under the dual liability regime,
victims reluctant to sue knowing that the discriminator, whom they
hold to be more responsible than the employer for their injuries,
cannot be held accountable by the courts will have an added incen-
tive. Presumably, there is no doubt that an increase in the number
of lawsuits filed by victims of employment discrimination will re-
sult in a decrease in discriminatory conduct.
88
B. Individual and Employer Liability Are Both Necessary to Fully
Compensate Employment Discrimination Victims
In order for victims of employment discrimination to feel
truly compensated for their injuries, the actual discriminator, as
well as his or her employer, should be held jointly and severally
liable. 189  After examining the purposes of its state anti-
186 Gonos, supra note 159, at 292.
187 EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
188 See Goldberg, supra note 160, at 583-84 (arguing that agent liability is needed to en-
courage litigation-shy victims to sue). Encouraging victims to sue also furthers the congres-
sional goal of redressing employment discrimination. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the effect
of individual liability on victim compensation).
189 DOBBS, supra note 23 (discussing the principle of respondeat superior, in which em-
ployers are generally jointly and severally liable, along with the employee, for torts committed
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discrimination law, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Genaro v. Central
Transportation, Inc.,190 held that a supervisor should be held
jointly and severally liable with his or her employer for the dis-
criminatory conduct of the supervisor in violation of state em-
ployment discrimination law. 191 When individual and vicarious
liability are both recognized, successful plaintiffs receive compen-
sation through monetary damage awards and personal vindication.
1. The Receipt of Monetary Compensation
As discussed previously, damage awards, although capped,
can be substantial; an individual defendant is unlikely to possess
sufficient funds to satisfy a judgment. 192 Rather, "[in a majority
of cases, it will be the employer that has the financial resources to
provide the most complete [monetary] compensation."' 193  Addi-
tionally, aside from the monetary awards, a judgment for the plain-
tiff may include remedies, such as reinstatement and promotion,
which are necessary to put the victim in the position he or she
would have been in had the discrimination never occurred. Again,
individuals are not capable of providing such relief, and thus, ab-
sent employer liability, those remedies would not be feasible. 194
Holding employers economically liable for the unlawful ac-
tions of their employees does not, however, guarantee that victims
will always be compensated. Rare instances may exist where the
employer's pockets are not deep enough and it is unable to pay any
or a fraction of the judgment award. 195 "The effect of joint and
several liability is to provide the plaintiff with more than one
source of funds but not more than one complete satisfaction."'
196
Under a system of joint and several liability, each defendant is
subject to liability for all of the plaintiff's damages. 197 The plain-
tiff can obtain a judgment against all defendants and then enforce
it against any one of them, or partly against one and partly against
another. 198 This system may prove especially effective in cases
where the employer is bankrupt or no longer in existence. The vic-
by the employee).
1-703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999).
191 Id. at 787-88; see also Gonos, supra note 159, at 292-93 (arguing that Title VII should
be amended to provide for joint and several liability).
192 See supra Part V.A. 1 (noting that the employees involved in discrimination cases gen-
erally are not highly compensated executives, but rather mid-level employees); supra note 39
(discussing the damage caps that Title VII places on employers).
19 3 Gonos, supra note 159, at 292.
194 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
'
95 Lamberson, supra note 159, at 420.
196 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 385.
197 Id.
199 Id.
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tim of discrimination does not have a means of recourse if the only
defendant is insolvent.' 99 Additionally, joint and several liability
may assist in full recovery when the employer is only able to sat-
isfy a fraction of the judgment amount. These situations reaffirm
the argument that the victim should be entitled recourse from the
individual perpetrator as well. °°
Additionally, in some instances, without individual liability,
discriminatory acts go unpunished, because, as the district court
ruled in Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,2 ° ' unless it can be shown that the
defendant was working in his capacity as an agent of the employer,
rather than his personal capacity, the employer will not be held
liable either.2 °2 Thus, it is necessary to recognize both individual
and vicarious liability to ensure that victims in all circumstances
receive the monetary recourse that they are entitled.
2. Victims Deserve Vindication and a Sense of Justice
An express purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "to
strengthen existing remedies to ... ensure compensation commen-
surate with the harms suffered by victims of intentional discrimi-
nation. This should not be construed to limit compensation to
economic recovery, because monetary relief alone is often inade-
quate to make a victim completely whole again, especially when
that monetary relief is not coming from the actual perpetrator, but
from a third party, the employer. 2 4  For many plaintiffs, retribu-
tion, rather than financial gain, may be the motivating factor for
bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit. Victims may not
feel vindicated unless the individual who committed the discrimi-
nation is joined as a defendant in the suit.20 5 At the very least, vic-
199See Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rec-
ognizing that employment discrimination plaintiffs are sometimes unable to sue because their
employers are bankrupt); Goldberg, supra note 160, at 583 (noting that "agent liability helps
realize the congressional goal of full compensation for unlawful discrimination by giving vic-
tims the option of suing an additional defendant who may be solvent").
200See Gonos, supra note 159, at 290-91 (noting that "[w]hile it is true that employers will
generally have a 'deeper pocket' than individuals, this will not always be the case .... Amend-
ing Title VII to include a cause of action against individuals would give victims an additional
avenue of recourse .. "); see also Archer v. Globe Motorist Supply Co., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (acknowledging the need to reconsider its decision rejecting individual liability
if the employer was undercapitalized).
1' 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
202 Id. at 1303 (holding that the employer was not liable because Tomka failed to prove that
her supervisor used his actual or apparent authority as Seiler's agent to accomplish the rape, and
rejecting her argument that the supervisor used his power to require her to attend a business
dinner).
203 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 556.
204 See Gonos, supra note 159, at 291 (stating that the goal of compensating victims should
not be construed in a narrow economic sense).205Lamberson, supra note 159, at 420-21.
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tims of employment discrimination deserve to have a sense that
justice has been served.2°
As explained in the previous section, victims are more likely
to sue if both the individual and employer are liable. °7 The finan-
cial difficulties may hinder victims of employment discrimination
from recovering full judgments and result in a reluctance to sue.
Holding both the individual and employer liable will help elimi-
nate some of the hesitance victims have filing lawsuits by provid-
ing them an alternative source of recourse. Therefore, by encour-
aging victims to sue, holding agents as well as their employers li-
able furthers the goal of rectifying employment discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The imposition of vicarious liability is an unquestioned com-
ponent of federal employment discrimination law.2°8 The circuit
courts ruling on the issue unanimously agree that employers alone
are legally responsible under the statutes for the discriminatory
acts of their employees. 209  Some state courts interpreting state
employment discrimination laws, have deviated from their federal
counterparts and have imposed individual liability. While initially
the issue of individual liability for employment discrimination was
a matter of statutory interpretation, the fundamental question has
become why individuals should or should not be held liable.
The credible arguments on both sides of the issue illustrate
that the weaknesses of one form are the strengths of the other.
Recognizing both individual and employer liability simultaneously
is the most effective means to satisfying employment discrimina-
tion law's objectives: The likelihood that victims will be redressed
and that discrimination will be deterred is substantially increased.
Therefore, by using the construction of the state laws as a guide,
the federal employment discrimination statutes should be rewritten
to permit individual, as well as enterprise, liability.
TAMMI J. LEES
206 See Gonos, supra note 159, at 291 (stating that "holding an individual personally re-
sponsible for their illegal acts is crucial to our sense of legal and moral justice").207 See supra Part V.A.2.
20 White, supra note 132, at 509.
209 Homey v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating that
every circuit court that has addressed the issue has found that there is no individual liability
under Title V11).
t J.D. Candidate, 2004, Case Western Reserve School of Law. I would like to thank my
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